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Abstract: 
In intra-group finance hybrid instruments allow for tailor-made form of finance. Hence hybrid finance 
is often used for international tax planning in multinational groups. 
Due to a lack of international tax harmonization or tax coordination qualification conflict can arise. A 
specific hybrid instrument is classified as debt in one country, and as equity in the other country. This 
may lead to double taxation. In the reverse case, double non-taxation can arise. Against this legal 
background one might expect that cross-border hybrid intra-group finance is advantageous in com-
parison to classical debt finance in case of double-non-taxation while it can be expected to be disad-
vantageous in the case of double taxation of the yield. Previous studies do not include qualification 
conflicts. Thus the question arises how qualification conflicts are affecting an intra-group finance 
decision. 
We examine effects of such qualification conflicts, resulting from the use of cross-border, intra-group 
hybrid finance, on the tax-advantageousness as compared to classical debt finance. The analysis is 
based on a binomial simulation model including economic and legal uncertainty. We show that the 
results of our analysis under uncertainty vary significantly when compared to the more obvious re-
sults under economic and legal certainty. 
 
Keywords: Hybrid finance, Cross-border intra-group finance, Qualification conflicts, Simulation  
 
JEL-Codes: G32, H21, H25, H26, M41  
 
  
  III 
Contents 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Intra-group cross-border hybrid finance ......................................................................................... 2 
3 Description of the research model .................................................................................................. 5 
3.1 Corporate group ...................................................................................................................... 6 
3.2 Integrating economic risk ........................................................................................................ 7 
3.3 Unconditional vs. conditional variable yield ........................................................................... 9 
3.4 Taxation of earnings .............................................................................................................. 11 
3.5 Modelling tax uncertainty ..................................................................................................... 14 
3.6 Measuring effects of taxation ............................................................................................... 16 
4 Results ........................................................................................................................................... 18 
4.1 Does risk influence the tax burden? ...................................................................................... 19 
4.2 Why does risk influence the tax burden? .............................................................................. 20 
4.3 Is hybrid finance advantageous? ........................................................................................... 21 
4.4 Does qualification uncertainty affect advantageousness? ................................................... 24 
5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
6 List of symbols ............................................................................................................................... 28 
7 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 30 
  1 
1 Introduction 
In intra-group finance, the possibilities for a parent company to finance its subsidiary range from 
equity on the one hand to debt on the other hand, with several hybrid forms of finance in between, 
combining elements of typical debt with characteristics of typical equity. Examples of hybrid finance 
are profit participating debt, preference shares, convertibles, or similar instruments. Hybrid instru-
ments are normally very flexible. They allow for tailor-made forms of finance and are thus ideally 
suited to be used in multinational groups. 
Irrespective of balance sheet treatment, hybrid instruments must be classified as either debt or eq-
uity for income tax purposes. More precisely, yet on a high level of abstraction: In the source state 
(the residence state of the debtor) the yield must be classified as either tax-deductible interest ex-
pense or as taxable dividend. In purely domestic transactions, where source state and residence 
state are the same, a coherent treatment is normally guaranteed. In a cross-border situation such 
coherent treatment is not necessarily granted. It may happen that a qualification conflict arises: a 
specific hybrid instrument is classified as debt in one country, and as equity in the other country. This 
may lead to double taxation (or even triple taxation where withholding tax is due and not credited): 
the yield of the instrument is considered dividend and subject to corporate tax in the source state, 
and it is considered taxable interest income in the residence state. In the reverse case, double non-
taxation can arise: the yield is considered tax-deductible interest in the source state, and it is consid-
ered tax-exempt dividend income in the residence state.  
Such qualification conflicts can arise as a consequence of lack of tax harmonization or tax coordina-
tion. Legal research shows that neither bilateral double tax conventions nor harmonization of tax 
laws on a European level (Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Interest and Royalties Directive) ensure single 
taxation of hybrid instruments (Eberhartinger and Six, 2009). 
This paper examines the effects of such qualification conflicts, resulting from the use of cross-border, 
intra-group hybrid finance, on the tax-advantageousness as compared to classic debt finance. The 
analysis is based on a binomial simulation model including economic and legal uncertainty. We will 
show that the results of our analysis under uncertainty vary significantly when compared to the more 
obvious results under economic certainty. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the impact of income taxation on finance de-
cisions, including hybrid finance. Section 3 explains the simulation model for the fiscal framework 
under uncertainty. Section 4 discusses the results of the simulation and chapter 5 finally provides a 
summary of the outcome of our investigation.  
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2 Intra-group cross-border hybrid finance 
The influence of taxes on the financing decision has been shown by several studies. According to 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), the tax-deductibility of interest has contributed to the general prefer-
ence of debt finance in corporate financing. The research of Miller (1977: 261-75), King (1977) and 
King and Fullerton (1984) is based on that finding. Robbins and Stobaugh (1972) investigated 
whether U.S. multinational enterprises prefer financing foreign subsidiaries either with debt or eq-
uity provided by either the parent company, another subsidiary or by sources outside the enterprise 
system. Weichenrieder (2007) has summarized the influence of taxation on the finance decision in 
empirical research. The studies of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) or MacKie-Mason (1990) have shown 
that the benefits in taxation due to a tax shield and loss carryforward substitute each other because 
interest expenditures just increase an already existing loss carryover. Chowdhry and Coval (1998) 
have found that a subsidiary’s capital structure involving the use of mainly debt or mainly equity ap-
pears to be an optimal choice only under the prerequisite of sufficiently different tax rates in both 
countries. Further, Bradley et al. (1984), Givoly et al. (1992), Hovakimian et al. (2001), and Goldstein 
et al. (2001) elaborate on the optimal capital structure.  Graham (1996, 1999, 2000, 2003), Shum 
(1996), Gordon and Lee (2001) and Gropp (2002) have illustrated the positive connection between 
tax rates and debt ratios. By using panel data on Italian companies, Alworth and Arachi (2001) pro-
vided strong empirical evidence for the cross sectional impact of both personal and corporate tax on 
the decision for debt financing of companies. On the basis of a large sample of European firms Huiz-
inga et al. (2008) have emphasized that a firm’s leverage depends on national tax rates as well as 
international tax rate differences and that the relationship between leverage and international tax 
rate differences thus reflects the presence of international debt shifting.  
In spite of numerous research results on tax and finance in general, research on tax and hybrid fi-
nance is rare. Some legal research has recently been published (among others Eberhartinger and Six 
2009; Six 2008; Wiedermann-Ondrej 2007), but empirical evidence is hardly available: data-bases are 
not adequate as they either do not give information on hybrid finance and/or as they include con-
solidated statements only, which by nature do not show intra-group finance. Discussion with con-
sultants shows that in specific cases, for specific enterprises, hybrid finance is used and large tax sav-
ings are achieved. By choosing an analytical approach, the paper adds to existing research and gives 
novel insights into the advantageousness of hybrid finance as compared to debt finance. 
In general, national and international tax law distinguishes between equity and debt financing. Ac-
cordingly, the returns for capital invested are either dividends or interest. At the debtor’s level, in-
terest expense is normally tax deductible, whereas dividend is paid from taxed income. At the credi-
tor’s level, interest income is normally taxable, and for dividend income frequently a shareholder 
relief applies.  
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Hybrid financial instruments (mezzanine finance) incorporate elements of both equity and debt. Con-
sequently, they cannot be conclusively classified as either equity or debt. The spectrum of hybrid 
financial instruments ranges from corporate shares with features typical for debt to loans with fea-
tures usually associated with equity investments. Broadly spoken, hybrid financial instruments are 
often formed by adding certain elements of equity instruments to debt instruments. They include 
inter alia silent partnerships, participating bonds, convertible bonds, warrant bonds, profit participa-
tion loans and preference shares. The advantage of hybrid financial instruments is the flexibility to 
tailor an instrument exactly to the needs of the investor or the issuer. For example, lenders can share 
in profits which basically would benefit the shareholders. Also, shareholders can cut their risks and 
benefit from protections traditionally granted exclusively to lenders (Wiedermann-Ondrej 2007: 4-5). 
Hybrid financial instruments also attempt to capitalize on tax advantages of debt without bearing its 
disadvantages. They can be structured in order to achieve a debt treatment for tax purposes but an 
equity treatment for accounting purposes, which eventually results in a cut in taxes but not in a de-
crease in the creditworthiness of a corporation (Wiedermayer 2001: 337). 
In financial accounting there are several possibilities to show hybrid instruments in the balance sheet 
(Bertl, 2005). However, it is difficult to clearly match some hybrid instruments to either equity or 
debt for tax purposes. Nevertheless, a definite classification in tax law into equity or debt is crucial 
because both equity and debt are treated completely differently in income and corporate tax. 
In a cross-border context, not only the qualification in the two countries involved is relevant; addi-
tionally the treatment of hybrid instruments in bilateral double tax treaties between two countries is 
essential. The relevant articles in double tax treaties concerning the returns on hybrid instruments 
are, according to the OECD-MC, Article 10 (dividends) and Article 11 (interest). Even though both 
articles attribute an unlimited right to tax the income received to the recipient state, they do not 
deny the source state’s right to tax the income by levying withholding tax either, at a level of 5, 10 or 
15%. In order to avoid double taxation, the state of residence in turn is obliged to credit the with-
holding tax against the corporate tax levied by the state of residence. However, regarding a possible 
qualification conflict, double tax treaties are only rarely helpful (Six 2008). They do not ensure paral-
lel qualification in the two states involved; at the most they open the way for a mutual agreement 
procedure (Helminen 1999: 273-4), or they apply subject-to-tax rules that rule out double non-
taxation. 
Also within the European Union, only little guidance in case of a qualification conflict can be found. 
Two Directives harmonize taxation in case of intra-European group finance: the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive (PSD)(90/435/EEC) and the Interest and Royalties Directive (IRD)(2003/49/EC). Both Direc-
tives still leave room for Member States to in- or exclude certain hybrid instruments from the bene-
fits of the Directives (Eberhartinger and Six 2009: 14). 
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As a result, qualification conflicts of hybrid finance are not solved by the existing measures of tax 
harmonization and coordination. There is still room for inconsistent qualifications of hybrid instru-
ments in international tax law. From a governmental viewpoint, neither double taxation nor double 
non-taxation is desirable. For multi-national corporations (MNC), at least the latter case is advanta-
geous and a constant source of international tax planning (Jacobs 2007: 1327-8). The best results for 
corporations would be achieved if a hybrid instrument is classified as debt in the subsidiary’s state of 
residence and as equity investment in the parent company’s state of residence, assuming certainty 
with regard to economic performance and legal qualification. Accordingly, the subsidiary’s income 
would be reduced by interest expenditures from the hybrid instrument. At the parent’s level, the 
yield received would be classified as dividend and possibly be exempt from tax. The result would be a 
double non-taxation of income. In case of a contrary qualification conflict (qualification as taxable 
dividend in the subsidiary’s state and as taxable interest income in the parent’s state), income would 
be taxed twice. 
This qualification uncertainty is a disadvantage of hybrid finance instruments because tax qualifica-
tion of classic debt financing can be assumed to be sure. So from the group’s point of view, setting up 
classic debt finance guarantees single taxation of the yield. Hybrid finance in contrast combines the 
chance of non-taxation and the risk of double-taxation. So it is to be expected that qualification con-
flicts influence the advantageousness of an instrument substantially. 
Results on the advantageousness of (hybrid) finance change when the assumption of economic cer-
tainty no longer applies, and when thus asymmetric taxation of profits and losses is included. If the 
finance decision under economic uncertainty leads to different or even worse results than the fi-
nance decision under economic certainty, tax planning under the presumption of economic certainty 
would lead to substantial mistakes, especially in cases of cross-border hybrid finance. In a more real-
istic scenario, (variable) interest payments would not immediately reduce a company’s tax burden. 
They may create or increase a loss carryforward. Moreover, interest would increase the parent com-
pany’s earnings and contribute to a higher total group tax burden. In this situation, hybrid instru-
ments classified as debt would be unfavourable, and even more so if the annual loss-offset is re-
stricted as it is the case in many tax systems. For this setting, equity finance would be favourable to 
debt finance and to hybrid finance. This is true not only if the tax rates of both countries are equal 
(Eberhartinger and Pummerer, 2009), but also if the tax rate in the subsidiary´s country is higher (to a 
reasonable degree) than in the parent´s country of residence (Eberhartinger and Pummerer, 2010). 
Both studies assume that a hybrid instrument is qualified equally as debt in both countries involved. 
In the latter case, the disadvantage of asymmetric taxation is not offset by the advantage of variable 
yield in combination with an advantageous tax-rate relation.  
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Against this legal background one might expect that cross-border hybrid intra-group finance is advan-
tageous in comparison to classic debt finance in case of double-non-taxation, while it can be ex-
pected to be disadvantageous in the case of double taxation of the yield. Previous studies do not 
include qualification conflicts. Thus the question arises how qualification conflicts affect an intra-
group finance decision. Hence, in the following we explore if and to which extent economic uncer-
tainty and qualification uncertainty influences the advantageousness of hybrid in comparison to clas-
sic cross-border intra-group finance. 
3 Description of the research model 
As described above, we include asymmetric taxation of profits and losses under economic uncer-
tainty, which is a key feature of tax regimes. In order to determine the actual tax burden, information 
on preceding periods is required. We base our analysis on a simulation model which allows capturing 
the effects of asymmetric taxation of profits and losses, in contrast to closed models.  
The model is subject to several restrictions: we focus on a 100% parent-subsidiary relation, both cor-
porations subject to corporate tax. The hybrid instrument that we consider offers a yield which is tax-
deductible and which depends on the result of the subsidiary. We do not include withholding tax, 
assuming that any withholding tax will be credited to the parent’s corporate tax. Neither do we in-
clude aspects of (dis-) advantageousness resulting from different tax rates in the two countries in-
volved, in order to fully focus on qualification conflicts.  
The basic idea of the approach is simple: We define a pre-tax world in which investors carry out dif-
ferent risky investments. In spite of specific characteristics of each possible investment, investors are 
indifferent to all investments, although risks may vary. In this context one can distinguish between 
two basic types of investors, namely the risk-averse investors and the risk-neutral investors. In order 
to provide a simple analysis we decided to focus on risk-neutral investors. If we focused on risk-
averse investors, the model would have to be expanded by a utility function. We will discuss in detail 
the advantages of assuming risk-neutral investors for our analysis later. 
In a first step, the setup of the model is illustrated by introducing the corporate group our analysis is 
focused on. Subsequently, we will elaborate on the integration of economic uncertainty in the 
model. In a next step, we will discuss our approach on how to implement qualification conflicts and 
legal uncertainty in our model. Finally, we will define an indicator which enables us to measure the 
effects of intra-group hybrid finance. We generally intend to emphasize the model’s structure by 
substituting a formal presentation by a graphical illustration. 
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3.1 Corporate group 
Our analysis focuses on a multinational group consisting of two corporations resident in two different 
countries. The residence state of the parent company is referred to as domestic country, the resident 
state of the subsidiary is referred to as foreign country. In order to label each country, we will use the 
subscript D for domestic and F for foreign. Figure 1 illustrates the group we focus on. 
Figure 1: Modelling the multinational group 
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The parent company’s investors set up the parent corporation by financing it entirely with equity. 
The parent invests its assets in the 100% subsidiary. Thus, the parent´s investment decision is re-
stricted to whether the subsidiary is to obtain additional equity or additional debt (hybrid finance of 
the subsidiary will be introduced in a later step.) Irrespective of that decision, the parent company 
will always own 100% of the subsidiary’s shares. In order to be able to analyse the full theoretical 
framework affecting the subsidiary’s financing, we neglect any thin capitalization rules or minimum 
equity ratios. Therefore, even an equity-ratio of zero during the subsidiary’s start-up period is possi-
ble. 
The subsidiary invests all capital received by the parent in assets to carry out a risky business. In or-
der to keep the model simple, we assume that the subsidiary’s investment cash flow equals its de-
preciation. Hence, the subsidiary’s assets should remain constant over time in the absence of eco-
nomic uncertainty. However, in any period the subsidiary’s return on assets is determined by eco-
nomic uncertainty. Thus the return on assets could either be positive or negative. The expected re-
turn on assets is defined to be constant over time. The modelling of the relationship between risk 
and return on assets is discussed in section 3.2. 
If the subsidiary in one year generates a profit, it is either reinvested in the subsidiary or distributed 
as a dividend to the parent company. Since our intention is to analyse the effects resulting from in-
tra-group finance, the various possible scenarios the subsidiary has to deal with may of course also 
result in a difference in the amount of the annual repatriation. Hence, according to our assumption, a 
fully equity-financed subsidiary only distributes dividends if a commercial profit after accounting for 
loss carryforwards is achieved. In contrast, a fully debt-financed subsidiary pays unconditional fixed 
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interest in any period. These unconditional payments are limited by the subsidiary’s possible bank-
ruptcy. 
In our model a loss equals a negative free cash flow. To avoid the subsidiary’s bankruptcy a certain 
amount of assets is sold in the loss period. Since the return on assets remains constant over time, a 
prior loss increases possible future profits or losses accordingly. In case a positive free cash flow is 
generated and no dividends are distributed, the subsidiary gains value. In subsequent periods, the 
application of the uncertain return on assets leads to increased profits or losses. These attributes are 
essential when discussing the effects of taxation in this environment. 
However, besides taxation also the financing decision is a binding advance repatriation decision. Ac-
cordingly, at least two approaches in the model’s context can be taken into account: 
 The subsidiary’s profit can be reinvested in the subsidiary. Accordingly no dividends are dis-
tributed. Interest payments by the subsidiary are immediately compensated for by the par-
ent company. From an economic point of view this would make little sense. Thus, if the par-
ent compensates the subsidiary for any interest payments, it would have been reasonable to 
finance the subsidiary with equity right from the start. However, to finance a subsidiary with 
debt may still result in tax advantages for the group of companies.  
 The subsidiary’s profit can be transferred to the parent company. In case of equity financing 
the subsidiary’s total commercial profit is distributed as a dividend to the parent company. 
Hence, in profit periods dividends and interest are paid to the parent. In contrast, in loss pe-
riods only interest is paid to the parent. 
Both alternatives limit the effects of binding advance repatriation decisions due to the specific design 
of the intra-group finance. Because we consider the latter option to be more realistic from an eco-
nomic point of view, we assume full dividend distributions by the subsidiary. As we will show in the 
following section, the expected rate of return for investments in the subsidiary and the parent are 
equal in our model. This specific feature of our approach for modelling economic uncertainty limits 
the economic effects of the repatriation decision in a pre-tax world. 
3.2 Integrating economic risk 
As outlined above, the group tax burden is a function of both the intra-group finance and the sub-
sidiary’s economic risk. In order to analyze the effects of intra-group hybrid finance under economic 
risk, the model must allow the variation of risk in accordance with the investment’s expected rate of 
return.  
A binominal-model suffices to account for uncertainty. At any time t there are only two future out-
comes in t+1. The assets A at time t depend on the return on assets realised in the respective period: 
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Figure 2: Modelling economic uncertainty 
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It depends on both the returns (u,d) and the probability measure p whether the investment in time  
t-1 meets the investor’s estimate. The continuously compounded expected return on assets is, ac-
cording to Figure 2 
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In financial literature (Hull 2005: 245) u and d are referred to as 
 ;u e d eσ σ−= = . (2) 
The term σ  represents the volatility of the return. 
According to our research focus, it is reasonable to assume that the expected rate of return is inde-
pendent of any risk. So 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln ln 1 frAE r u p d p e= ⋅ + ⋅ − =  (3) 
must hold. If u and d in (3) are substituted according to (2), (3) results in 
 
fre d
p
u d
−
=
−
. (4) 
The probability in (4) is usually referred to as Martingale Measure (Glassermann 2003; 37). Under 
this probability measure, the expected rate of return is not a function of risk. On the one hand, in-
creasing risk causes a higher return in case of an up- or downward move, on the other hand the in-
creasing return is exactly compensated for by the decreasing probability of an upward move. 
If investors do not demand risk compensation, they are considered risk neutral. The assumption in 
(3) may be considered as unrealistic since investors are usually risk averse. However, the assumption 
of risk-neutral investors is a common approach to analyze effects of taxation (Bradley et al. 1984; 
Chowdhry and Coval 1998, Green and Hollifield 2003). It does not substantially limit our analysis for 
the following reasons: 
 We are not developing a general valuation model. Our focus is to determine a terminal value 
under economic uncertainty. Hence the assumption of volatile returns seems to be more im-
portant than modelling the probability for various kinds of investors. 
 From a technical point of view, risk-neutral investors seem to be better suited for our analy-
sis of tax effects because repatriation decisions in a pre-tax world would have no impact on 
the terminal value of the group at all. For this reason, the intra-group financing decision does 
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not affect the terminal values in a pre-tax world. This in turn would not apply to risk-averse 
investors in case parent and subsidiary are not perfectly correlated. The assumption of risk-
neutral investors ensures that all differences in the terminal values result from taxation. This 
allows isolating the tax effects. 
 Financing a subsidiary with debt may eventually result in the subsidiary’s bankruptcy. How-
ever, in a pre-tax world bankruptcy would not affect the expected terminal value of the 
group because, due to the assumption of risk-neutral investors, the expected return would 
be the same for the parent and subsidiary. So the simplifying assumption of risk-neutral in-
vestors ensures even in case of bankruptcy that the terminal group value is independent of 
the design of the intra-group finance. 
 The tax effects derived from a risk-neutral model may eventually show a trend for risk-averse 
investors, because changing to a different (individual) probability measure in order to com-
pute the expected terminal value (and its distribution) does not result in reversed results. 
The characteristics of our underlying model according to the assumptions are illustrated in Figure 3 
for 20%σ =  and 50%σ = . 
Figure 3: Modelling economic uncertainty 
                                 
The higher the volatility, the higher the risk, and thus the higher the return in a positive scenario and 
the higher a loss in the negative scenario, respectively. If the probabilities remained constant, the 
expected return would increase with increasing risk. However, assumption (3) guarantees that the 
effects of increasing returns are compensated by the change of probabilities. So, in other words, 
increasing risk is connected with an increasing span between the assets after a positive or negative 
movement. 
Next we discuss how a hybrid financial instrument must be designed to compare to a conventional 
debt instrument in this model environment. 
3.3 Unconditional vs. conditional variable yield 
As discussed above, typical debt financing may lead to an increase in the subsidiary’s loss carryfor-
ward, whereas interest payments are subject to tax at the parent company. However, in case of a 
hybrid debt instrument the interest payment is subject to economic uncertainty and depends on the 
subsidiary’s economic performance. That is why it may be reasonable to define variable interest as a 
percentage of the period profit. Accordingly, in case of a subsidiary’s loss, the disadvantage of a pos-
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sible non-deduction in the foreign country and simultaneous taxation in the domestic country could 
be avoided. 
A prerequisite for analysing tax effects of hybrid instruments is to define the hybrid instrument in a 
way that investors would be indifferent if confronted with the possible investment alternatives “clas-
sic debt finance” and “hybrid finance” in a pre-tax world. In reality, hybrid instruments with variable 
yield are often featured with a minimum (floor) and maximum interest rate (cap). We consider an 
instrument with a floor of zero as appropriate, but we do not include a negative floor.  
Since we assume risk-neutral investors the interest rate of classic debt is the risk-free interest rate. 
This assumption may be considered inappropriate if debt has a default risk unequal to zero. How-
ever, since we discuss an intra-group finance contract the default risk can be neglected, because the 
parent company 
 is affected by the subsidiary’s economic risk in any case, independent of the intra-group fi-
nance decision, and 
 will definitely not have to file for bankruptcy because of intra-group interest payments. 
Due to these arguments we consider a riskless interest rate which is independent of the subsidiary’s 
risk as a useful assumption for our analysis. As far as the possible bankruptcy of the subsidiary is 
taken into account, even the unconditional interest payment, i.e. the subsidiary’s obligation to con-
stantly pay interest, is risky. Hence only the obligation to constantly pay interest is unconditional. The 
difference between these alternatives is illustrated in the following figure. 
Figure 4: Unconditional vs. conditional interest payments 
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If the expected interest rate of the hybrid instrument is to be equal to the risk-free interest rate, then 
 ( ) with fr p ln u u eσpi= ⋅ ⋅ =  (5) 
must hold. Substitution and rearrangement leads to 
 
fr
p
pi
σ
=
⋅
. (6) 
The variable pi  is the fraction of the positive return that has to be agreed on as variable yield when 
setting up a hybrid instrument. 
Since the assets depend on the subsidiary’s economic performance, the realized yield may differ over 
time although the same expected interest rate is applied. This does not affect the group terminal 
value in a pre-tax world because the expected rate of return is equal for both parent and subsidiary. 
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3.4 Taxation of earnings 
To integrate taxation into the model we interpret the change in asset values as earnings before in-
terest and taxes (EBIT). Hence tax payments reduce the assets that can be deployed for the next pe-
riod. Even if the expected return on assets remains unchanged, future profits and losses are lowered 
by taxation. 
According to Figure 1, in case of a possible qualification conflict, yield payments by the subsidiary to 
the parent can be qualified as interest payment or as dividend, both in the parent’s country (domes-
tic) and in the subsidiary’s country (foreign). For integrating qualification conflicts in our model we 
introduce a dummy variable 
/domestic foreignq  for the situation under consideration. Since both fiscal au-
thorities can qualify yield as interest or dividend, four constellations must be distinguished: 
 
/ 1I Iq = : The domestic and the foreign fiscal authority qualify the yield as interest. 
 
/ 1E Iq = : The domestic fiscal authority in the parent’s country of residence considers the yield 
as dividend while the foreign fiscal authority qualifies the yield as interest. 
 
/ 1I Eq = : The domestic fiscal authority considers the yield as interest while the foreign fiscal 
authority qualifies the yield as dividend. 
 
/ 1E Eq = : Both fiscal authorities consider the yield as dividend. 
Due to the fact that only one of these situations can occur, [ ]0,1q ∈  and / / / / 1I I E I I E E Eq q q q+ + + = . 
For classic debt financing 
/ 1I Iq = . 
The subsequent figure illustrates how the group terminal value is developed over time when taxation 
is taken into account. 
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Figure 5: Developing terminal value 

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    
t t t t tNP DA EBIT Div TA= = + −
  
−= +1t t tFA FA NP
Subsidiary Parent
debt qualification
debt qualification
equity qualification
equity qualification
 
Subsidiary: 
The subsidiary’s EBIT is calculated by multiplying the value of its last-year capital by its current return 
on assets.  
In our model, fixed or variable interest (I), as the case may be, has to be paid periodically by the sub-
sidiary. In case the subsidiary has lost a big part of its capital, it may not be able to pay the full 
amount of interest, if any at all. Thus, in a first step a min-function calculates if the periodic interest 
payment exceeds the remaining capital plus the EBIT. The max-function outside the brackets ensures 
that interest payments cannot be negative.  
The deduction of interest expense (fixed or variable) from EBIT leads to the subsidiary’s earnings 
before tax (EBT). We assume that yield, once qualified as interest, is not subject to any further re-
strictions on its tax deductibility such as thin-capitalization rules or shareholder debt financing rules.
1
 
                                                           
1
 Our model captures most of these restrictions as well; however, this is not the focus of our study and would 
require a different interpretation of the results. 
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As a result of the risky business activities of the subsidiary, it can also generate losses. Accordingly 
and in compliance with most tax systems worldwide, current EBT can be offset against losses from 
prior periods. The annual loss offset (LO) is limited by the amount of the existing loss carryforward 
from previous years on the one hand, and, if applicable, by a percentage λ of current EBT that may be 
offset at maximum. This latter restriction is prevalent in some countries (such as Germany or Aus-
tria). If this restriction does not apply, λ equals 1. We exclude loss carryback from our analysis – it is 
not frequently found and usually limited in time and amount. 
The loss carryforward (LCF) in a year is therefore reduced by its use in a year, and/or is increased by 
remaining losses which cannot be offset in the current year.  
The annual tax amount payable (TA) results from the tax rate (τ) times the annual tax base (TB), 
which results from subtracting offset losses from current positive EBT. Yield for a hybrid instrument 
that is qualified as equity does not reduce the tax base. It does reduce, however, the net profit (NP), 
which is the EBT minus the tax payable minus the respective dividend-like yield.  
For our model, we assume that distributable profit and taxable profit are determined on the same 
basis, which is the EBT. We assume further that profit distribution restrictions follow the continental 
European model: dividend payments are possible only if there is a (commercial) net profit, and only 
to the extent the (commercial) net profit exceeds the loss carryforward from previous years. The 
distributable amount (DA) therefore equals the net profit less the loss carryforward; the actual dis-
tribution (Div) is a quota (δ) of the distributable amount. The value of the subsidiary’s assets at year-
end is calculated by adding the current net profit and subtracting current dividend distribution to the 
value of the previous period’s assets. 
Parent:  
In the first period the parent transfers its entire equity to the subsidiary as subsidiary’s equity or debt 
or hybrid finance. Hence the parent receives interest income and, if applicable, also dividend income 
from the subsidiary. The interest income it receives is included in all cases: fixed interest or variable 
yield, qualified as interest or as dividend income for tax purposes. From the second period on, the 
parent’s EBIT is composed of interest/dividend/hybrid yield from the subsidiary and of its earnings 
generated via an investment of its funds (income from the subsidiary from the previous years). 
We assume that the parent enjoys full dividend relief. This means that its tax base excludes dividend 
income as well as income from variable yield from hybrid finance which is classified as dividend in the 
parent’s country. 
As shown in the equations, we exclude any kind of group taxation or consolidated tax base from our 
analysis. 
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3.5 Modelling tax uncertainty 
Legal uncertainty is usually discussed in the context of unclear future tax legislation. However, we 
address a modified kind of legal uncertainty. We focus on the taxpayer’s uncertainty on how tax au-
thorities qualify the realised intra-group finance, which includes but is not restricted to future 
changes in tax law.  
For our analysis we consider the situation that the group agreed on intra-group finance in the past. 
At the time of decision-making, the final qualification by fiscal authorities is uncertain. The qualifica-
tion of the intra-group finance is revealed in a tax audit at the end of the ten-year observation pe-
riod. From our point of view this is a realistic and useful assumption since most countries have not 
established an advance ruling up to now. 
For classic debt financing, qualification conflicts are unlikely. When setting up a hybrid debt finance 
instrument the situation may be different. The legal situation may differ in countries and additionally 
fiscal authorities have significantly more latitude of discretion, due to the unclear legal situation. 
The basic problem for decision makers in the context of qualification conflicts is illustrated by a sim-
ple example. Let’s assume that an interest payment of 10 is agreed on. The marginal tax rate should 
be 25% for both countries. The probability that the domestic fiscal authority in the parent’s country 
qualifies the yield as dividend is 
de
p , and the probability for qualifying the yield as interest is 
1
di de
p p= − . Accordingly, the foreign fiscal authority in the subsidiary’s country qualifies with prob-
abilities 
fe
p  and 1
fi fe
p p= − . The probabilities in the two countries are independent of each other: 
we assume that countries rely on their own judgement and their own legal framework only, so there 
is no (or at least no successful) bilateral exchange of information. 
When fiscal authorities are completely uncertain about how to qualify the instrument, each qualifica-
tion probability is 50%. Thus, legal uncertainty is at a maximum. 
Figure 6: Modelling tax uncertainty 
qualification 
f
TA  
d
TA  
i
p  +
f d
TA TA  ( )E TA  2
TA
σ  
E/E 2.50 0.00 25% 2.50 0.63 0.00 
E/I 2.50 2.50 25% 5.00 1.25 1.56 
I/E 0.00 0.00 25% 0.00 0.00 1.56 
I/I 0.00 2.50 25% 2.50 0.63 0.00 
   100%  2.50 1.77 
As can be seen from the graph there is a range from non- to single- to double-taxation depending on 
the hybrid instrument’s qualification. Since the situation of double taxation is as probable as double 
non-taxation, the disadvantages are exactly offset in this example. The expected tax payment is then 
2.5, in spite of a possible qualification conflict. But legal uncertainty as defined above changes the 
risk of the tax claim. Without a qualification conflict the standard deviation is zero. In our example, 
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with a qualification conflict, the standard deviation of the tax claim is 1.77. Hence, risk-neutral inves-
tors would judge each tax claim equally, but risk-averse investors would not, as they would be more 
affected by a possible qualification conflict. So the results derived in our example underestimate the 
effects from a risk-averse investor’s point of view. 
Consequently, double taxation scenarios could be considered a quantitative obstacle for employing 
intra-group hybrid finance. In the following, our results suggest that this would be a misleading inter-
pretation. 
Given that the probabilities for the two different fiscal authorities to qualify a yield as either dividend 
or interest are uncorrelated, infinite combinations of the probabilities may occur. Nevertheless, our 
analysis requires a connection between the decisions of fiscal authorities. 
Our goal is to explore the influence of qualification conflicts on the advantageousness of a hybrid 
finance instrument. As can be seen in Figure 6, the taxpayer of course prefers double non-taxation. In 
case no qualification conflict occurs, the use of hybrid finance is riskless. This requires 
 1 1
de fi
p and p= =
 
(7) 
to be true. To analyze the effects of qualification conflicts we assume that the probabilities of both 
domestic and foreign fiscal authorities are linked according to 
 1
fe de
p p= − . (8) 
Values for the probabilities according to this assumption are summarized in the following table. The 
probability 
de
p  is then exogenous, while all other probabilities are endogenous. 
Figure 7: Decision probabilities of fiscal authorities 
de
p  
di
p  
fe
p  
fi
p  
0% 100% 100% 0% 
10% 90% 90% 10% 
20% 80% 80% 20% 
30% 70% 70% 30% 
40% 60% 60% 40% 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
60% 40% 40% 60% 
70% 30% 30% 70% 
80% 20% 20% 80% 
90% 10% 10% 90% 
100% 0% 0% 100% 
Varied probabilities 
de
p  can under these assumptions be interpreted in a way that 
 1
de
p =  leads to reliable double non-taxation (best case). 
 an increasing probability 
de
p  causes a move away from best case to worst case. 
  50%
de
p =  implies the maximum of legal uncertainty.
 0
de
p =  leads to reliable 
In other words, 1
de
p =  definitely 
case. The standard deviation of the tax claim of
tion uncertainty, is illustrated in 
Figure 8: Standard deviation of tax claim in case of qualification conflict
We analyse the advantageousness of a hybrid instrument, depending on the probability that the 
favourable scenario can be expected,
authority qualifies the yield as dividend.
3.6 Measuring effects of taxation
Based on the different intra-group finance
the whole group for t10. In the pre
observable. Overall, 1024 paths lead to these 11 outcomes. 
In the pre-tax world it does not matter which path 
count the specific path matters. When a 
year, taxes are levied in the first year,
granted instead of negative tax. 
value after two periods: the tax base of the second period is reduced by a loss offset.
As explained above, taking asymmetric taxation into account requires a simulation approach
needs a limited observation period. Our observation period is
loss carryforward generated during the ten years may occur. 
value because they may reduce 
account for existing loss carryforward
 
 
double taxation (worst case). 
leads to the best case, while 0
de
p =  definitely 
 the example above, as a representative for qualific
Figure 8. 
 
 by varying the probability that the domestic
 
 
 decisions, we derive different terminal values of assets 
-tax binomial model, after ten years 11 different outcomes are 
 
leads to an outcome in t10. Taking taxes into a
profit in the first year is followed by a 
 while in the second period (normally) a 
In the opposite case, the company ends up with a different 
 ten years. At the end of this period a 
These loss carryforwards may be 
the future tax burden. A standard assumption in tax literature is to 
s by computing a global tax shield γ  that should be assigned to 
16 
leads to the worst 
a-
 
 (parent’s) fiscal 
for 
c-
loss in the second 
loss carryforward is 
terminal 
 
, which 
of 
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the loss carryforward. According to past empirical results, γ  is estimated to be 40% (Schneider 1988: 
1222). This estimate includes a discounting effect and a risk component. 
In contrast to this simplifying assumption we integrate existing loss carryforwards taking into account 
that 
 high loss carryforwards mainly occur when over the years the assets of the subsidiary were 
almost lost due to economic risk. Return on assets is assumed to be constant. So in situations 
with a high loss carryforward it takes rather long to benefit from a tax reduction, even when 
a longer period with profits follows. Due to this long time period needed to generate a tax 
shield from the loss carryforward, the present value of the tax reduction is relatively low. 
 riskier entities more likely accumulate a loss carryforward. If it is likely that loss carryfor-
wards are generated by the future activity itself, then it is unlikely that loss carryforwards 
generated in previous periods can induce a future tax reduction. 
The valuation of a loss carryforward as suggested in literature does not cover these effects. This re-
sults in an overassessment of loss carryforwards at the end of the observation period. To avoid this 
overestimation we cut the valuation by increasing the inherent risks and decreasing the value of the 
assets. According to previous simulation results, an exponential cutting function seems to be appro-
priate: 
 

 

,10
,10
10
10
 for 0
0 for  0 
i
i
A
LCF
A
i
e LCF
LCF
χ
−

 >
= 

= . 
(9) 
If all assets were lost during the first ten years (e.g. by bankruptcy), an existing loss carryforward is 
worthless, and the value of the cutting function is one. In other words, 100% of a loss carryforward 
are cut due to the fact that no or only little future profits can be generated by applying the constant 
return on assets. 
Independent of the assets, the value of LCF in t10 must depend on the risk of subsidiary’s activity. This 
effect is covered by the subsequent cutting function. In order to reduce the global valuation of loss 
carryforwards regarding the risk of the activity, we use the following expression: 
 
i
e
σσχ −= . (10) 
When we calculate the group terminal value we measure already existing loss offsets in t10 according 
to  
   ( ) ( ),10 1 1Ai i i i sVLCF LCF σγ χ χ τ= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ . (11) 
These assumptions lead to the following overall terminal value 
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 ( )   ( )1024 ,10 ,10 ,10
1
i i i i
i
E GTV A FA VLCF p
=
= + + ⋅∑ . (12) 
In case of intra-group hybrid finance a group terminal value is calculated for all four different qualifi-
cation constellations. Depending on the qualification probabilities, the terminal value is the expected 
value of the four different terminal values: 
 ( )    ,10 / / / // / / /hf hf hf hf hfI I E I I E E EI I E I I E E EE GTV GTV p GTV p GTV p GTV pτ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ . (13) 
Since the initial net assets are independent of intra-group finance, we define an effective tax rate for 
the period of ten year as 
 


,10 0
10 0
1
eff
GTV A
GTV A
τ
τ
−
= −
−
. (14) 
The effective tax rate reveals which part of the expected profit over a specific period time is taxed 
away. This measure covers effects of compound interest, so it is a function of time. 
In Figure 9 we show the calculation of this effective tax rate for one period, assuming the parameters
20%, 75%, 40%, 25%
P S
σ λ γ τ τ= = = = = . The probability for an upward move is, according to (4), 
55.15%. The return assigned to an upward move is 1.2214.  
Figure 9: Determining effective tax rate 
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In spite of a 25% statutory tax rate, the effective tax rate amounts to 61.74%. This is a direct conse-
quence of the asymmetric taxation of profits and losses. 
4 Results 
Our analysis focuses first on a foreign subsidiary which is entirely equity- or entirely (classic) debt- 
financed (sections 4.1 and 4.2). The results will show that the use of hybrid finance is expected to 
help to reduce the effective tax burden. We will then test the advantageousness of cross border, 
intra-group hybrid finance with qualification conflicts (sections 4.3 and 4.4). 
 4.1 Does risk influence the tax burden?
In a first step we simulate the dependency of the effective tax rate 
activity. Figure 10 illustrates the effective tax rate as a function of risk for an entirely equity
company and for an entirely (classic) debt
clearly depends on the subsidiary’s risky activity. I
(25%) in both countries. 
Figure 10: Effective tax rate and risk
Under economic certainty ( =σ
effective tax rate of 28% occurs even though the statutory tax rate is 25%. This is due to the fact that 
the effective tax rate introduced in equation 13 is a function over time. Hence, the effective ta
den is increasing over time because compound interest influences the effective tax rate.
As soon as we include risk (volatility of results,
worse results (higher effective t
financing. This may seem surprising
finance being superior to equity finance from a tax perspective. As 
the fact that interest payments are due also in case of loss, which does not immediately reduce tax 
payments but instead (only) increases a loss carryforward. 
At a very high risk, the effective tax rate quickly approaches 100%.
erable increase in the effective tax rate lies in the fact that within the ten
are taxed whilst also (high) loss carryforwards may be generated which finally cannot be offset within 
ten years. 
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s from 
or this consid-
 The upper graph in Figure 10 shows a stronger bend. W
effective tax rate in case of debt finance 
again. We can conclude from these results that the relevance of the intra
limited to medium-risky business. Both riskless as well as high risk
ence of the effective tax rates.  
We would like to underline that 
differ, as debt financing becomes 
residence is higher than in the parent’s
4.2 Why does risk influence the tax burden?
The reason for the substantial growth of the effective tax rat
ing our ten-year analysis. In order to illustrate this effect
during this period is shown in the subsequent figure.
Figure 11: Risk and loss carryforward
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AEB), with increasing risk also the expected loss
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However, in case the subsidiary is 
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loss carryforward is almost insensitive to
 
ith increasing risk, the difference between the 
and in case of equity finance first increases, then decreases 
-group finance decision is 
-activities result in only little diffe
we did not consider tax rate differences. The result would 
more attractive when the statutory rate in the 
 state of residence. 
 
e is due to the restricted loss 
, loss carryforward which ha
 
 
 
 carryforward emerges during our ten-year analysis. This situ
C. Even though the subsidiary is entirely 
 carryover increases significantly 
entirely debt-financed as in CFD, the increase 
in the expected 
 debt financing essentially influences the 
year period in a very risky situation, e.g. alongside BD, the expected 
 the method of financing. Especially in 
20 
r-
obviously 
subsidiary’s state of 
offset dur-
s not been offset 
a-
equity-financed (line 
at the end of the 
in the expected loss 
loss carryforward 
loss carryforward. 
situations with an 
  21 
average risk level, the finance method has significant impact. This situation is illustrated e.g. along-
side point E to F.  
As a result, and in compliance with the results from Figure 10, under economic certainty or high risk, 
the cross border, intra-group finance decision does not have an essential impact on the loss carry-
forward (and on the effective tax rate) in the last year of our analysis, though it is crucial in moder-
ately risky situations.  
4.3 Is hybrid finance advantageous? 
The high rise in the effective tax rate under increasing risk, as shown in the previous section, asks for 
a solution in order to avoid constantly increasing loss carryforwards at the subsidiary due to interest 
expenditures, and a higher tax burden at the parent company due to interest income. A profit-
related, variable compensation for debt-financing may lead to essential benefits for the corporation. 
In the next step we will analyze if a hybrid instrument as outlined in 3.3 can lead to a reduction of the 
high effective tax burden related to risky business activities. 
In order to deduce the effectiveness of a hybrid instrument we illustrate the composition of the ex-
pected terminal value in form of a distribution. The partial terminal values which can be assigned to 
the realizations of a corresponding number of upward moves are summarized in this distribution. In 
other words, Figure 12 shows the specific terminal values depending on the number of profitable 
years (upward moves) in the respective path in the ten-year period. 
Due to the design of our research model, there are two paths offering no or ten upward moves re-
spectively. As can be seen in Figure 12, the majority of all paths lead to the middle of the distribution. 
The distribution is skewed to the right in compliance with assumption (2). This is also true when as-
suming risk-neutral investors (4). 
According to our previous considerations, the best case for the group is non-taxation of all cross-
border yield payments. This is the case if the subsidiary’s state of residence qualifies the yield as tax-
deductable interest whilst the parent company’s state of residence qualifies the yield as non-taxable 
dividend income. This scenario leads to the terminal-value distribution illustrated in the left-hand 
graph below.  
The worst case for the group is a definite double taxation of the earnings. This is the case if the yield 
is qualified as dividend in the subsidiary’s state and as interest in the parent’s state of residence. 
Accordingly, the corresponding probability for the yield to be qualified as tax-exempt dividend in-
come is zero. This situation is illustrated in the right-hand graph below. In addition to the graphical 
illustration of the distribution there are also two tables providing the exact composition of the spe-
cific terminal values. 
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Figure 12: Distribution of terminal values qualification conflict 30%, 75%, 40%, 25%σ λ γ τ= = = =  
                                    
= 100%
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From the figure on the left it may be concluded that hybrid instruments may be advantageous, espe-
cially if “average” overall earnings are realized. According to the graphical illustration, one may de-
duce that there is no difference between hybrid and debt financing in both the case of 10 profit peri-
ods and 0 profit periods (10 loss periods). However, according to the tables below, the expected dif-
ferences are rather small, and they do not contribute substantially to the terminal value. The reason 
for this is that the occurrence probability for each situation is very low. However, due to the fact that 
the majority of all possible 1024 paths lead to the middle of the distribution, their occurrence prob-
ability is relatively high. That is why these “middle” realizations contribute significantly to the differ-
ence resulting from hybrid or debt financing respectively. 
From the analysis of the left figure it is obvious that in case of double non-taxation the hybrid finance 
leads to fundamental advantages compared to debt finance. Still, the exorbitant total tax burden 
cannot be completely avoided through the use of a hybrid instrument because also profit-related 
interest cannot prevent the taxation of profits abroad under uncertainty. 
Surprisingly enough, hybrid finance is not advantageous in all realizations, even when considering 
double non-taxation of cross-border interest payments (left figure). If no, one or two upward moves 
occur during the ten-year period, then classic debt finance is advantageous in comparison to hybrid 
finance even though cross-border interest payments are untaxed in case of hybrid finance (negative 
difference in the left hand table). This can be explained by the fact that no, one or two upward 
moves are equivalent to ten, nine or eight downward moves (losses) during the ten years. In other 
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n. of ups classic debt hybrid debt TV∆  
10 0.34 0.36 0.02 
9 2.93 3.13 0.20 
8 11.07 11.96 0.89 
7 23.49 25.91 2.42 
6 30.20 34.58 4.38 
5 25.11 29.41 4.29 
4 14.52 16.56 2.04 
3 6.06 6.14 0.07 
2 1.81 1.40 -0.40 
1 0.33 0.17 -0.16 
0 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
115.90 129.62 13.73
 
n. of ups classic debt hybrid debt TV∆  
10 0.34 0.32 -0.02 
9 2.93 2.77 -0.17 
8 11.07 10.52 -0.55 
7 23.49 22.73 -0.77 
6 30.20 30.34 0.14 
5 25.11 25.96 0.85 
4 14.52 14.68 0.16 
3 6.06 5.46 -0.60 
2 1.81 1.26 -0.55 
1 0.33 0.15 -0.18 
0 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
115.90 114.20 -1.70 
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words, in most of those ten years losses occur. When e.g. two upward moves follow previous eight 
downward moves, classic debt financing allows a loss offset in the profitable periods. Variable, condi-
tional hybrid finance yield payments are higher than fixed, unconditional interest payments. Hence, 
hybrid finance limits the chance to make use of a loss offset (less profit left). The disadvantage of 
reduced loss offset at the subsidiary’s level in case of hybrid finance weighs more heavily than the 
disadvantage of corporate tax on interest income at the parent’s level in the case of classic debt fi-
nance. In such a scenario, hybrid finance may prove to be disadvantageous in spite of a double non-
taxation scenario. 
Apart from the partial disadvantage of hybrid finance in the situation the subsidiary ends up with a 
huge loss after ten years, the analysis shows clearly that overall a quantitative relevant advantage is 
to be expected. When double-non taxation can be assured hybrid finance is clearly a useful instru-
ment that helps to prevent the group from over-taxation of the risky business (129.62 vs. 115.90). 
The left-hand figure above (best case) was designed under the assumption of a definite double non-
taxation. In contrast, the right-hand figure was designed under the assumption of double taxation 
(worst case). One would expect hybrid finance in case of double taxation to be disadvantageous in 
comparison to classic debt finance.  
Surprisingly, this is not necessarily the case. Hybrid finance is disadvantageous when the number of 
upward moves exceeds the number of downward moves (6 – 10 profit periods). If profit periods pre-
vail, the yield according to a hybrid finance agreement is higher in comparison to classic debt finance. 
Since these higher yields are subject to double taxation and since classic debt finance ensures single 
taxation of interest payments, hybrid finance is disadvantageous. 
When the number of profit periods decreases, hybrid finance proves to be advantageous (four or five 
up movements within ten years). In contrast to our expectations the expected group terminal value 
in case of doubly taxed hybrid finance exceeds the group terminal value in case of single-taxed classic 
debt financing. When analyzing these realizations, the explanation of this effect becomes obvious. In 
case of a loss, hybrid finance does not induce yield payments. Hence, in spite of the legal double 
taxation, due to a negative qualification conflict, no economic double taxation occurs. On the other 
hand, in case of classic debt finance, unconditional fixed interest increases a loss carryforward in the 
state of residence of the subsidiary and, at the same time, cross-border interest income is taxed at 
the parent’s level. Accordingly, unconditional interest is subject to an economic double taxation 
while hybrid finance doesn’t cause any taxation (in spite of legal double taxation). 
When at maximum three upward moves occur within the ten years, hybrid finance proves to be dis-
advantageous again. In these situations, the effect that hybrid finance limits the chance to offset 
existing loss carryforwards in combination with taxation of the interest payments in the parent’s 
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state of residence dominates. The advantage of hybrid finance, to usually not increase a loss carry-
forward, does not play any important role when large overall losses occur. 
Considering the overall expected terminal value (114.20 vs. 115.90), hybrid finance is slightly (!) dis-
advantageous when doubly taxed. According to the findings illustrated in Figure 6, the hybrid finance 
was expected to clearly (!) underperform classic finance when doubly taxed. However, as far as the 
analyzed constellations are concerned, the advantage of the loss offset and the avoidance of eco-
nomic double taxation almost compensates for the disadvantages of the double taxation. 
Another substantial finding from Figure 12 is that the corporation’s method of finance substantially 
influences the terminal value, whereas the distribution of the terminal value is just marginally influ-
enced. From our point of view, this result supports the assumption of risk-neutral decision makers in 
our model. 
4.4 Does qualification uncertainty affect advantageousness? 
Up to now no general statements about the advantages of hybrid instruments in the context of eco-
nomical uncertainty and the qualification risk can be deduced from the previous analysis, because 
only one specific volatility 30%σ =  and two boundaries for 
de
p  were under consideration. For more 
general results, the difference between the effective tax rate in case of hybrid finance and the effec-
tive tax rate in case of debt finance will now be simulated as a function of the subsidiary’s risks and 
the probability of a double non-taxation. A positive τ∆  indicates that hybrid finance is advantageous 
as compared to classic debt finance, while a negative τ∆  indicates that hybrid finance is disadvanta-
geous. The results are summarized in Figure 13. The horizontal square in Figure 13 marks the border 
between the positive area and negative area. 
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Figure 13: Effective tax rate as function of risk and ; 75%, 40%, 25%
de S P
p λ γ τ τ= = = =  
 
There is a linear interrelationship when the double non-taxation’s occurrence probability is varied 
under economic certainty. This linear interrelationship is illustrated alongside AFB. If the occurrence 
probability for double non-taxation is 50%, the difference of the effective tax rate is, depending on 
the form of finance, approximately 0 (Point F). This is the result derived in the example shown above 
(Figure 6). (Due to the additional taxation of the parent company’s assessed interest there are also 
marginal differences in the effective tax rate.) If the occurrence probability for double non-taxation 
increases further, the best result under economic certainty is achieved at point B. In this case it is 
also not possible to avoid taxation completely because the tax-free interest earnings from abroad 
result in higher domestic compound interest which is subject to tax in any case.  
If double non-taxation is certain ( 100%
de
p = ), and if the risk increases (Line BC) a little up to approx. 
30%, the advantageousness of hybrid finance increases even further. This is due to the fact that in 
addition to double non-taxation at an average risk the loss carryforward of the subsidiary can be 
reduced. As already stated above, at a very high risk (40% and above) the finance decision becomes 
irrelevant because the loss carryforward is generated and independent of any intergroup financing 
equally in both scenarios. Accordingly the advantageousness of the hybrid finance begins to decrease 
again (point C), but is still considerable. 
In case double taxation is certain ( 0%
de
p = , point A), hybrid finance is disadvantageous, and it does 
not become advantageous if the risk increases. However, to us it seems remarkable firstly that the 
disadvantage of the hybrid finance is limited to a relatively small area (restricted by the points A, D, E 
and F), and secondly that in spite of certain double taxation the comparative disadvantage is only 
approx. 5% although the statutory tax rate is 25%. 
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Hence we can conclude that also the risk of a qualification conflict in most cases does not lead to the 
disadvantageousness of the hybrid finance. 
5 Conclusion 
The use of cross-border hybrid finance is perceived to offer considerable tax advantages in an inter-
national context. In a profitable environment, double-dip constellations allow cases of double non-
taxation of the yield: full deductibility at the debtor’s level and tax-free repatriation lead to an un-
taxed form of finance, which is of particular interest for multinational groups. However, the use of 
hybrid finance in a cross-border setting is frequently connected with the risk of reassessment by fis-
cal authorities, eg. as a result of a tax audit. As a result the group may end up with double taxation in 
the worst case. 
Sadly enough, economic reality does not offer a purely profitable environment. As soon as the possi-
bility of risky business at the subsidiary’s level is included and losses are to be expected eventually, 
the disadvantages of asymmetric taxation – immediate taxation of profits vs. tax relief for losses only 
with a time-lag, if at all – play a significant role and interfere with otherwise logical results. 
By use of simulation, we analysed the advantageousness of cross border intra-group hybrid finance in 
a risky economic environment. In order to isolate the effect of qualification conflicts (differing qualifi-
cation of the yield as interest-like or as dividend-like in the two countries), we did not include differ-
ing statutory tax rates in our analysis. The hybrid instrument offers variable yields, provided that 
profits are earned. 
The results support previous research stating that debt finance of a foreign subsidiary, contrary to a 
general notion, is disadvantageous as compared to equity finance.  
The disadvantage of debt finance can be overcome when doubly untaxed hybrid finance is employed. 
However, in cases where almost only losses occur or where almost only profits occur in a given num-
ber of years, the advantage of hybrid finance is negligible, against expectation.  
In cases where legal double taxation of hybrid finance is certain or probable, hybrid finance is, as 
expected, disadvantageous. However, even here, under specific circumstances, hybrid finance can be 
even advantageous, due to the overweight of the disadvantages of asymmetric taxation in case of 
debt finance. Additionally, in case of a risky business, the disadvantage of hybrid finance is relatively 
small, and legal double taxation does by far not result in a double effective tax rate.  
In cases where the qualification of hybrid finance as equity or debt in the domestic country as well as 
in the foreign country is uncertain (50%), the chances of double non-taxation and double taxation are 
equal, and hybrid finance still proves to be advantageous. 
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To conclude, tax planning measures employing hybrid finance normally offer the chance of untaxed 
income, and are connected to the “risk” of single, or worse, the risk of double taxation. Our results 
show that while the chance of double non-taxation is even higher when including economic uncer-
tainty as a variable and reduces the effective tax rate considerably, the risk of double taxation is 
small and leads to only a little additional effective tax burden. In other words: with the use of intra 
group, cross-border hybrid finance, chances are good and risks are small, when qualification conflicts 
may arise. 
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6 List of symbols 

tA  assets at time t 
u  yield due to an upward move in the economy 
d  yield due to downward move in the economy 
roa  continuously compounded expected return on assets 
σ  volatility of the return on assets 
p probability measure 
t point of time 
cond
r  conditional interest rate 
f
r
 
riskless interest rate 
pi  participation hybrid finance in case of a positive return 

tEBIT  earnings before interest and taxes 
tIɶ  interest payment in t 

tEBT  earnings before taxes 

tLO  loss-offset 
λ  maximum loss-offset in percent 

tLCF  loss carryforward 

tTB  tax base 

tTA  tax payment 
S
τ  tax rate of subsidiary 
P
τ  tax rate parent  
eff
τ  effective tax rate 
P
TV  terminal value parent 
S
TV  terminal value subsidiary 

tNP  net profit 

tDA  distributable amount 

tCLCF  commercial loss carry-over 

tDiv  dividend payment 
δ  percentage of dividend distribution  

tPLCF  commercial profit and loss carryforward 

tFA  financial assets 
de
p  probability for a payment being qualified as dividend in parent’s residence state 
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di
p  probability for a payment being qualified as interest in parent’s residence state 
de
p  probability for a payment being qualified as dividend in parent’s residence state 
di
p  probability for a payment being qualified as interest in parent’s residence state 
γ  global tax shield assigned to loss carryforwards in t10 
i  number of a path 
A
i
χ  cutting function for loss carryforwards due to low assets 
i
σχ  cutting function for loss carryforwards due to low assets 

tVLCF  valuated loss carryforward 
GTV  group terminal value 
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